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AKRON LAW REVIEW
because of a particular need of one branch of government, the Court has
placed governmental functional needs above individual rights. This is a
dangerous approach that opens the way to future encroachments on an
individual's fundamental rights.
Hopefully this decision will be interpreted so as to have a positive
impact on further legislation governing the distribution of papers of other
constitutional officeholders. Opening the business records of all government
offices (as opposed to the personal papers of such officeholders) to adminis-
trative review in order to protect the public against abuses of power at all
levels would constitute one such positive impact. This legislation could be
promulgated under Title II of the Act, although Congress has not yet con-
templated passage of any such measures.
PATRICIA L. SPENCER
EVIDENCE
Affirmative Defenses , Defendant's Burden of Proof
Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance • Due Process
Patterson v. New York, 97 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in Patterson v. New York1 upheld
the constitutionality of a New York murder statute which places on
the defendant the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance. The
Court thereby determined that New York courts in applying the statute
against defendant Gordon Patterson had not violated his right to due process
of law.
1 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2321 (1977).
2 The statute provides in relevant part:
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person
or. of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an
affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which
is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation
under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained
in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a
conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
[Vol. 11:2
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Gordon Patterson's short marriage was marred by frequent disagree-
ment and pervaded by general incompatibility.3 After Patterson became
estranged from his wife, she revived a relationship with John Northrup, a
man to whom she had been engaged prior to her marriage to Patterson."
One evening, Patterson found his wife partially undressed with Northrup
in the bedroom of her home. Patterson took a rifle from his car, shot North-
rup twice in the head,5 and was subsequently charged with murder.
The main issue at Patterson's trial was whether or not he had acted
under "the influence of extreme emotional disturbance"6 as defined in the
New York murder statute.7 The trial court found Patterson guilty of murder
in the second degree and the Appellate Division affirmed.' While appeal
to the New York Court of Appeals was pending, the United States Supreme
Court issued its controversial" decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur," which
deemed unconstitutional a Maine statute shifting the burden of persuasion to
the defendant asserting the affirmative defense of acting in the heat of
passion."2 The Mullaney Court said the unconstitutionality arose due to the
fact that the prosecution was relieved of the burden of proving that the
defendant had acted with malice aforethought. By placing the burden of
persuasion for having acted in the heat of passion on the defendant, the
defendant was deprived of due process protection as guaranteed by the
Court in In re Winship."
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the argument of the defense,
3 Comment, Affirmative Defenses after Mullaney v. Wilbur: New York's Extreme Emotional
Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN U. L. REV. 171 (1976) citing Trial Transcript, People v. Patterson,
Index No. 30538 (Steuben County Ct., July 6, 1971).
4 97 S. Ct. at 2319.
5 Id.
6 43 BROOKLYN U. L. REv. 171, supra note 3.
7 See note 2 supra.
897 S. Ct. 2319 (1977).
9 People v. Patterson, 41 App. Div. 2d 1028, 344 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1973).
10 The controversy arose over the likely effect of the Court's decision that a defendant could
not to be saddled with the burden of coming forward with an affirmative defense. See Evans
v. State, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976), in which the court held that because of Mul-
laney, due process was offended by putting the burden of proof on the defendant for any
theory of justification or mitigation. But see State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 218 S.E.2d
176 (1975), which stated that Mullaney was not applicable to all affirmative defenses, and
that the burden may be placed on the defendant for the defense of insanity. See also
Hamilton v. State, 343 A.2d 594 (Del. 1975), in which the court placed only the burden of
persuasion on the defendant and required the prosecution to bear the burden of proving
the defense did not exist. For a prediction of the effects of Winship and Mullaney on
affirmative defenses in Ohio, see Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio after Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L. J. 828 (1975).
11421 U.S. 684 (1975).
12 Id. at 704.
13397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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that the Mullaney holding applied in Patterson's case, and affirmed his
conviction." Patterson appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court, which distinguished the two cases. Specifically, the Court found that
although in Mullaney it had been unconstitutional for Defendant Wilbur
to be burdened with proving the absence of one of the essential elements of
the crime,15 it was not unconstitutional for Defendant Patterson to be bur-
dened with proof of extreme emotional disturbance. In distinguishing the
cases, the Patterson Court relied on the difference in the criminal elements
included in the definitions of murder in the respective statutes.1"
It is a premise well-grounded in constitutional law that the prosecution
in a criminal case must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain
a conviction.' The Court in In re Winship, speaking through Mr. Justice
Brennan, stated: "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."'" The logical inference to be drawn from such
strong, clear language is that a defendant may not constitutionally be bur-
dened with disproving an element of a crime." However, this inference, so
easily drawn, is not always correct when applied. This problem of application
confronted the Court in Mullaney and in Patterson, two cases similar in
situation but seemingly diametrically opposed in outcome."0
The Maine statute under scrutiny in Mullaney retained the common
law definition of murder2' in requiring a finding of "malice aforethought,
14 People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, cert. granted,
97 S. Ct. 52 (1976).
15The Court explained:
Maine law requires a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to
manslaughter. Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence
when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he deserves a significantly
lesser sentence .... We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion....
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975).
16 In Patterson, the majority stated: "It is plain enough that if the intentional killing is
shown, the State intends to deal with the defendant as a murderer unless he demonstrates
the mitigating circumstances." 97 S. Ct. at 2325.
1Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895). See also Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); Glover v. United States,
147 F. 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1906).
18 397 U.S. at 364.
19 97 S. Ct. at 2325.
20 Id. at 2329.
21 421 U.S. at 693 n.15.
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either express or implied."2 The absence of malice resulted in a reduction
of the crime to manslaughter.23 Because this element alone made such a
vast difference in culpability, in fact the only difference between the two
crimes, " the Court construed malice as an element of the crime of murder"
in contradiction of the statutory construction by the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court." Thus, finding that under the statute the burden was on the defendant
to prove that he acted in the heat of passion in order to rebut the presumption
of malice aforethought," the Court held the burden unconstitutional under
the standards set out in Winship2" and affirmed the holding of the Court
of Appeals that the statute was unconstitutional.29
A possible explanation for the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's statutory
construction is that the court viewed malice aforethought not as an essential
element of the crime of murder, as it was in Winship,3" but merely as a
policy presumption which allowed a jury to find a defendant guilty of murder
once the prosecution had proved an intentional and unlawful killing.81 Taking
this concept further, the Maine court found that manslaughter and murder
were not separate crimes, but only different degrees of homicide which
22 The Maine murder statute, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964), provides:
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or
implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life.
23 Maine's manslaughter statute, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2551 (1964), provides in pertinent
part:
Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation,
without express or implied malice aforethought . . . shall be punished by a fine of not
more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years ....
24 421 U.S. at 698. See also Comment, The Constitutionality of Criminal Affirmative De-
fenses: Duress and Coercion, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 123 (1976).
25 421 U.S. at 698.
26 Id. at 689. Using strong, explicit language, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded
that according to Maine Statutes, manslaughter and murder were but two degrees of one
crime of felonious homicide. The court explained its view in State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d
647 (Me. 1973), which was decided while appeal was pending for Mullaney to the United
States Supreme Court. Subsequently, the Supreme Court accepted the Maine court's con-
struction and held that state courts may exclusively interpret state laws in the absence of
"extreme circumstances not present here." Id. at, 691. Likewise, in Patterson the Court
reiterated this rule and added that it is the state's business to regulate who must bear the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion. 97 S. Ct. at 2322.
For a comprehensive argument against federal intervention in the setting of Mullaney
v. Wilbur, see Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal
Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEX. L. REV. 269
(1977).
27 421 U.S. at 701.
- 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
29 421 U.S. at 704. But see 55 TEX. L. REv. 269, 277 (1977).
s0 397 U.S. at 364.
31 See Comment, Due Process and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The
Remains of Federalism After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 ME. L. REV. 37 (1974).
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related to degrees of punishment." Therefore, Winship's requirement that
the prosecution must prove every fact necessary to constitute a crime would
not apply to a policy presumption which entitles the jury to impose a
greater degree of punishment. The Court, in rejecting this characterization
of Maine law, categorized malice aforethought as a fact and murder and
manslaughter as crimes." It is probable that the Mullaney Court was hesitant
to extend the clout of Winship to "nonprovable facts"3" which act only to
affect the degree of punishment.
Therefore, when Patterson appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court and claimed he had been unconstitutionally burdened with proof of
an affirmative defense," the Court found a more modernized statute requir-
ing only three elements for a murder conviction: intent, causation and
death."6 The New York manslaughter statute" provides that if the defendant
acted under the "influence of extreme emotional disturbance," 8 then the
murder charge will be reduced to one for manslaughter. The burden of proving
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance was thereby cast
onto the defendant," a burden Patterson failed to meet just as Wilbur, the
defendant in Mullaney, had. Yet, the Court in this instance affirmed the con-
viction."0 The question then arises: Did the Court in Patterson base its
:2 Id. at 74. Cf. 421 U.S. at 699 wherein the Court explains:
But under Maine law these facts of intent are not general elements of the crime of
felonious homicide . . . . Instead, they bear only on the appropriate punishment cate-
gory. Thus, if petitioners' argument were accepted, Maine could impose a life sentence
for any felonious homicide--even one that traditionally might be considered involuntary
manslaughter-unless the defendant was able to prove that his act was neither inten-
tional nor criminally reckless.
33 26 ME. L. REv. at 74.
84 Id.
35 97 S. Ct. at 2322.
36 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). See note 2 supra for text of statute.
ST The statute provides:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he
acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a)
of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance
reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any
prosecution initiated under this subdivision.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (2) (McKinney 1975).
38 Id.
39 The burden of proving an affirmative defense is allocated in N.Y. PENAL LAw § 25.00 (2)
(McKinney 1975), as follows:
(2) When a defense declared by statute to be an "affirmative defense" is raised at
trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of
the evidence.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2330.
[Vol. 11:2
5
Johnson: Patterson v. New York
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
opinion, so disparate from the opinion in Mullaney, solely on the differences
in language used by the states in drafting their murder statutes?
As mentioned above, the Maine statute provided for a presumption of
malice if heat of passion was not shown by the defendant.' The majority
opinion in Patterson relies on this presumption as a basis for distinguishing
the Maine statute from the New York statute."2 Mr. Justice White reasons
that "a state must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by
presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense.""
But as Mr. Justice Powell points out in his dissent:
New York, in form presuming no affirmative "fact" against Patterson,
and blessed with a statute drafted in leaner language of the 20th cen-
tury, escapes constitutional scrutiny unscathed even though the effect
on the defendant of New York's placement of the burden of persuasion
is exactly the same as Maine's. 4
The majority opinion appears to overlook the crux of the issue by
basing its reasoning superficially on the language of the statute." It is true that
after Winship was decided, but before the decision in Mullaney, the conclu-
sion might have been drawn that the Court meant that only the definitional
elements of the crime needed to be proven." But after Mullaney, it was
clear that an interpretation of Winship must encompass not only considera-
tion of a statute on its face, but also what effect the presumptions allowed
by that statute will have on the defendant. " That is, there must be con-
sideration of the repercussions a murder conviction will have upon the sub-
4' 421 U.S. at 686. See generally Comment, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney
v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HAiv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 390 (1976).
42 97 S. Ct. at 2325.
43 Id. at 2330.
44 Id. at 2333 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
-1 Id. at 2330.
46 The Court in Winship did not specify whether the substantive elements of the crime
should be considered or merely the statutory language. See note 18 supra.
47 421 U.S. at 697-98. The Court interpreted Winship to include more than just those
elements which if not proved would wholly exonerate the accused. It stated:
The analysis fails to recognize that the criminal law . . . is concerned not only with
guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal culpability.
Maine has chosen to distinguish those who kill in heat of passion from those who kill
in the absence of this factor . . . . By drawing this distinction, while refusing to require
the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it turns,
Maine denigrates the interests found critical in Winship ....
Moreover, if Winship were limited to those facts that constitute a crime as defined
by state law, a State could undermine many of the interests that decision sought to
protect without effecting any substantive change in its law. Id.
Cf. 55 TEx. L. REv. 269, 274. The author takes the position that Mullaney's view of Winship
removes any limit on the elements which contribute to the degree of culpability for a crime.
RECENT CASESPall, 19771
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stantive fights of an individual as opposed to a conviction for manslaughter.'"
The Court in Mullaney concluded that if the defendant failed to prove he
acted in the heat of passion, that fact alone could be "of greater importance
than the difference between guilt or innocence for many lesser crimes.""
Under this view, the defendant is in danger of being deprived of due process
protection if forced to bear the burden of proving that he acted without
malice aforethought. However, the Court in Patterson counters this position
by averring that Patterson's case is not a proper one on which to impose
the reasoning of Mullaney."0
The majority reasons that the New York statute is more similar to the
one confronted by the Court in Leland v. Oregon."' There the Court found
that once the prosecution had proved each element of the crime charged,
the defendant could be burdened with proving the defense of insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. In so doing, the Leland Court reasoned that the in-
sanity issue was divorced from proof of any element of the crime. 2 The
Court in Patterson adopts the Leland standard of due process and states that
after the prosecution had proved that Patterson had the intent to kill and
had effected Northrup's death,53 the prosecution had discharged its duty and
any responsibility for proof of mitigating circumstances lay with Patterson."
However, Mr. Justice Rehnquist differentiates between the defenses of
insanity and heat of passion, thus weakening any reliance on Leland by a
court dealing with a mental state not as severe as insanity." In his concurring
opinion in Mullaney, Justice Rehnquist explains that Leland comports with
the mandates of Winship because insanity does not necessarily have a signifi-
cant bearing on the requisite mental elements of a crime." Therefore, bur-
48 421 U.S. at 698.
49 Id.
50 97 S. Ct. at 2325.
51 343 U.S. 790. In Leland, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statute re-
quiring the defense of insanity to be proved by the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court held the statute to be constitutional.
52 Id.
53 97 S. Ct. at 2324.
.4The Court explained:
This affirmative defense, which the Court of Appeals described as permitting "the
defendant to show that his actions were caused by a mental infirmity not rising to the
level of insanity, and that he is less culpable for having committed them," App. Ill.,
does not serve to negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order
to convict for murder. It constitutes a separate issue on which the defendant is required
to carry the burden of persuasion; and unless we are to overturn Leland and Riviera,
New York has not violated the Due Process Clause, and Patterson's conviction must
be sustained.
Id. at 2325.




Johnson: Patterson v. New York
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
dening the defendant with proof of insanity would not be unconstitutional as
would a burden of proof of an element which is so intimately entwined with the
degree of culpability as in the case of heat of passion in the Maine statute.
5 7
If insanity and extreme emotional disturbance are not two defenses which
can be logically compared to each other, reliance on Leland as precedent
for Patterson"' is unfounded.
Such reliance seems to evidence the majority's attempt to limit the
holding of Mullaney to that which had been decided in Winship." The feared
interpretation of Mullaney was that the prosecution might always be required
to prove the absence of affirmative defenses.6" However, this practice has
still not been adopted by a majority of the states." Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Court to use Patterson as a device to limit any misuse of
the Mullaney holding. 2 Even the MODEL PENAL CODE from which New
York took much of its homicide statute,63 places the burden of proving the
absence of extreme emotional disturbance on the prosecution, and thus
differs from New York's imposition of the burden of persuasion on the
defendant.6 " Presently, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia shift
the burden to the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the existence of an affirmative defense. " Twenty-eight states burden the
defendant with producing an affirmative defense and the prosecution with
proving the absence of that defense. 6 The evidence thus seems to indicate
that the holding in Mullaney did not lead to abuse by the legislatures in
shifting to the prosecution the burden of disproving all affirmative defenses. 7
There still remains the possibility, however, that after the holding in
Patterson, the defendant might be forced to bear the burden of proving
elements of a crime, which although not expressly stated in a statute, affect
the rights of the defendant so substantially that they become or are treated
as elements of a crime.s States, by enacting leaner and vaguer statutes,
57 Id.
58 97 S. Ct. at 2325.
59 397 U.S. at 364.
60 97 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
31 Cf. notes 65 & 66 infra.
62 97 S. Ct. at 2333.
63 Id. at 2332.
C4 Id.
6 Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to
the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REV. 499, 503 n.35 (1976).
GG Id. at 505 n.41.
67 Id.
68 97 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court concluded: "We therefore will not disturb the balance struck
in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the offense of
which the defendant is charged." Id.
Fall, 1977l RECENT CASEs
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could free the prosecution from bearing the heavier burden, and instead,
cast it upon the defendant, thus depriving him of due process." The Court
takes notice of this possibility but argues that enactment of such legislation
is regulated by the Constitution."'
It is painfully clear, however, that exactly such lean language in a
statute made a vast difference in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court
in Patterson. If, in cases such as Mullaney, Leland, Winship and Patterson,
which deal -with a defendant's constitutional right to liberty,7 the Court is
going to determine where the burden lies strictly on the basis of statutory
language, then the crucial question becomes whether or not a state may
draft a statute which excludes elements so determinative of the defendant's
culpability."2
For example, if a state enacted legislation which defined murder solely
as the killing of a human being and an affirmative defense to this charge
was a lack of intent to kill, burdening the defendant with proof of this
defense would be unconstitutional.73 However elementary this conclusion
may seem, it is just this type of decision a state legislature faces when draft-
ing criminal statutes.74 Which circumstances of a crime can the defendant
be constitutionally required to prove? At what point does an affirmative
defense become so inextricably entwined with the substantive elements of
a crime that the defendant may not be said to be burdened with disproving
guilt which has been cast on him by a criminal statute?
The Ohio statute has aptly dealt with these questions by lifting from the
defendant the burden of proving affirmative defenses.75 In State v. Robinson,"8
the Ohio Supreme Court cogently interpreted the ramifications of the
statute. The Robinson Court stated that the defendant has the burden of
going forward with evidence bearing on an affirmative defense to the extent
that as a matter of law, the court can find that there is sufficient evidence
69 Id. at 2336 (Powell, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 2327, citing McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916), "It is
not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual presumptively guilty of
a crime."
71 421 U.S. at 698-99.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 698; Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 96 (1934); McFarland v. American Sugar
Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916); Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 118 (1968).
74 421 U.S. at 699 n.24.
75 Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (a) (Page 1975), states in relevant part:
(a) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of
going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused.
7647 Ohio St. 2d. 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976).
[Vol. 11:2
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to make a case for the trier of fact." The state then has the burden of per-
suasion which is fulfilled when the lawful quantum of evidence has been
introduced so as to persuade the trier of fact that the fact is true. The bur-
den of going forward is decided as a matter of law and the burden of per-
suasion is a factual determination."8 The reasoning of the court is logical.
When the defendant has met the burden of going forward with evidence
that is sufficient to convince the court as a matter of law that he is advancing
a valid issue, the defendant has at the same time raised a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt, thereby requiring the prosecution to bear the burden of
proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 This reasoning
was recently adopted in State v. Gideons ° in which the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals made it clear that the burden of proof in criminal cases
never shifts from the state.81 Thus, it appears that in Ohio the problem
confronted by the Court in dealing with a statute which allows the burden
of persuasion to be borne by the defendant will not arise in the case of an
affirmative defense.
Because the statute in Patterson allowed the defendant to be burdened
with such proof of affirmative defenses," the constitutionality of some other
state statutes may come into question.
A statute that is contested by a defendant on constitutional grounds
must be examined in two steps. First, the court must distill from the statute
those elements which are necessary to constitute the crime charged. Not
only must the court view the face of the statute, but it must also examine
its substance.8" Second, the court must decide if the state has deleted from
its statutory definition elements of the crime which are then made affirmative
defenses, thereby burdening the defendant with their proof by a preponder-
T7 Id. at 112.
Ti Id. at 113.
79 Id. at 109. But see 36 OHIo ST. L. J. 828 (1975).
80 52 Ohio App. 2d 70 (1977).
81 The court reasoned:
The burden of proof in a criminal case is on the state and that burden remains
with the state throughout the trial . . . . When an affirmative defense becomes an
issue in the trial, the burden of proof does not shift from the state to the defendant
... . All that is required of the defendant to obtain an acquittal on the basis of an
affirmative defense is to point to evidence relating to the affirmative defense issue,
whether introduced by the state or the defense, which is sufficient to create in the
minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. When this occurs, the state has
failed to meet its burden of proof and the defendant should be acquitted.
Id. at 74.
82 The Patterson majority stated: "We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative,
operative country-wide, that a State must disprove beyond reasonable doubt every fact con-
stituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused." 97 S. Ct.
at 2327.
83 421 U.S. at 699-700,
Fall, 1977] RECENTr CASES
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ance of the evidence. Under Patterson,8" the defendant is permitted to bear
the burden of the preponderance of the evidence as long as the affirmative
defense being proved is not one which entails a fact the existence or absence
of which should be constitutionally proved by the prosecution.85
In order to avoid the constitutional error of making the absence of an
important element of a crime an affirmative defense, a state after Patterson
might be wise to enumerate exactly which affirmative defenses will be ac-
cepted in its courts. If it does not, and instead relies on a broad statutory
definition of what constitutes an affirmative defense,88 the result may be a
time-consuming case-by-case analysis of whether a defendant's due process
rights have been violated by burdening him with persuading the jury that a
particular defense he advanced did in fact exist.
In states like Ohio, where the defendant currently bears only the burden
of going forward with the evidence supporting an affirmative defense, the
Patterson decision has little direct impact. That is, if the court accepts the
constitutionality of giving the defendant the heavier burden of persuasion
in such cases, it undoubtedly approves for him the lighter burden of going
forward. If, however, state legislators in such jurisdictions view the Patterson
decision as a green light to increase the defendant's burden to the New York
standard, Patterson demands that the statute defining affirmative defenses
be carefully drafted.
In the future the Court will use the test newly formulated in Patterson
when viewing state statutes which allow the state to place the burden of
persuasion on the defendant for an affirmative defense. In rejecting the
Mullaney/Winship test which required an examination of a defendant's
substantive rights, the Court has adopted a statutory language test.8 7 The
latter is a less difficult test to apply because arguably, it entails only a
formalistic survey of the statutory definition of a crime.
However, remnants of the Mullaney/Winship test still require that
certain due process rules be observed." Those statutes which give a name to
the absence of a certain element of a crime, as Maine did by labeling the
absence of heat of passion as malice aforethought, still must fall under the
new statutory language test. This rule evinces the retention of the Mullaney
84 97 S. Ct. at 2327.
85 Id. at 2330.
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (c) (Page 1975), provides for two categories of affirma-
tive defenses, stating in pertinent part:
1) a defense expressly designated as affirmative;
2) a defense involving an excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the
accused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence.
87 97 S. Ct. at 2336 (dissenting opinion).
88 Id. at 2330.
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Court's holding that the trier of fact cannot presume an element of a crime
without proof beyond a reasonable doubt." By Wilbur's failure to persuade
the jury that he was acting under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance, the statute allowed the jurors to presume that malice was present
in Wilbur's mind before he killed his victim. Winship, Mullaney, and Patter-
son forbid this violation of a defendant's due process rights. In essence, that
is the crux of the holding in Mullaney. A strict application of Mullaney's
holding to the facts in that case will not produce a liberal rule allowing the
Court to probe into every state statute looking for deprivations of a defen-
dant's substantive rights. The Court in Patterson made it clear that it had
intended Mullaney to be construed narrowly."0 Therefore, Patterson did not
limit Mullaney but instead served as an interpretive device, showing the
latitude that the Court intended Mullaney should be given.
In the future, a statute such as Ohio's will easily pass muster before
the Supreme Court because it prohibits the state from saddling the defendant
with the burden of persuasion in affirmative defenses. In a New York-type
jurisdiction, the only problem which might arise after Patterson would be
deciding which defenses under an ambiguous statutory classification might
constitutionally be considered affirmative defenses. For that reason, perhaps
the most desirable statute would include an enumeration of affirmative de-
fenses.
Statutes which allow the presumption of an element of a crime from
the facts surrounding it unless the defendant can prove an affirmative de-
fense by a preponderance of evidence, shall fail as unconstitutional under
Patterson as they did under Mullaney. 1 Those statutes which are attacked
as unconstitutional because the defendant has to prove the existence of an
affirmative defense by a preponderance of evidence but where the absence
of an affirmative defense is not an element of the crime, represent the gray
area when trying to delineate the bounds of constitutionality. However, it
89 Id.
90 The Patterson Court stated:
Mullaney surely held that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by
presuming that ingredient upon proof of the other elements of the offense ....
It was unnecessary to go further in Mullaney ....
As we have explained, nothing was presumed or implied against Patterson; and
his conviction is not invalid under any of our prior cases.
Id.
91 421 U.S. at 703-04; North Carolina v. Hankerson, 97 S. Ct. 2339 (1977). Hankerson was
decided as a companion case with Patterson. Elements of murder were presumed against
the defendant under a statute similar to that encountered in Mullaney, and Mullaney was
held to apply retroactively.
Fall, 1977]
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appears that in that gray area the Court will follow the direction indicated
in Patterson and allow such a statute to stand without an exhaustive examina-
tion of the defendant's substantive rights.
LEE ANN JOHNSON
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